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WHY ARE STANDARDS IMPORTANT? 
 
The deepening of globalisation after the Second World War was facilitated by 
the systematic reduction in trade barriers. Despite the continued existence of 
preferential trade schemes which favour particular groups of countries (for 
example, least developed country exporters to high income countries, or 
regional trade partners), there has been a widespread and systematic 
tendency for trade-quotas to be eliminated and for trade-tariffs to be simplified 
and lowered. However, at the same time as these trade barriers have been 
reduced, a new family of barriers have been introduced to govern world trade 
- a growing family of standards over products and processes.  
 
Standards as a barrier to trade 
There are three distinctive and related characteristics of standards as a 
barrier to global trade:  
 
1. Unlike tariffs and quotas, they are not just established by governments, but 
also involve a range of private actors.  
 
2. Unlike tariffs and quotas which are publicly codified, many standards are 
opaque. The rules and regulations which producers have to meet are often 
neither widely publicised or stable and consistent.  
 
3. Unlike tariffs and quotas where there are established mechanisms to 
resolve conflicts (for example, the dispute resolution procedures under 
WTO), the determination of performance with respect to standards is 
generally an asymmetric process, determined solely by the buying party or 
country, with the producer having little capacity to challenge decisions on 
conformance. 
 
The importance of standards to low income countries 
There are consequently five major reasons why standards have become 
important for low income country producers participating in global markets: 
 
1. Standards have become a major determinant of market access, 
particularly in high income markets 
 
2. Many high-margin market segments are defined by product and process 
standards (for example, organic foods) 
 
3. In developing the capacity to achieve standards, many producers develop 
capabilities which enhance their efficiency and their capacity to 
systematically increased productivity 
 
4. Meeting standards is generally a costly process, and this can act as a 
barrier to entry for small scale and informal producers.  
 
5. Many standards require coordinated actions along the value chain, and 
this systemic performance may be difficult to achieve. 
 
2 
Each of these five issues have important policy consequences, and will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
A SHORT HISTORY OF STANDARDS 
 
We can distinguish three families of standards involved in the historical 
development of standards governing production and trade – those set in the 
private sector, those emanating from the state sector, and those arising out of 
civil society initiatives. 
 
Private sector standards 
The origin of modern standards can be trace to the latter half of the 19th 
Century. During the American Civil War, soldiers found it difficult to 
“cannibalise” damaged rifles. That is, although all of the rifles were produced 
to a common design, the stock of one rifle did not always fit the barrel of 
another. Similarly, when the first large volume cars were introduced in the 
early 20th Century, the gearbox of one car did not necessarily fit into another 
car of the same manufacture. This led to the development of what came to be 
called “The American System of Manufacture”, that is the development of 
systematic procedures for calibration, enabling the standardisation of 
component production. This process of standardisation was a core and 
necessary building block in the growing division of labour and the rolling out of 
mass-production which underwrote industrial growth for much of the twentieth 
century, and set the scene for the further development of process standards 
towards the end of the 20th Century. 
 
A second important development in the private sector’s use of standards 
occurred during the 1970s. Its origins were to be found in the Japanese auto 
industry. Modelled on the “Toyota Production System”, this standards-
intensive organisational paradigm diffused widely across the manufacturing 
and service sectors after the mid 1980s, and has come to be called “just-in-
time production” or “lean production”. The key development here was the 
demise of mass production’s standardised product (in Henry Ford’s famous 
phrase, “you could have a Model T Ford in any colour as long as it is black”). 
Customers increasingly sought more differentiated and higher quality 
products. Toyota discovered that this could only be achieved at a low cost by 
the development of flexible manufacturing organisation which required low 
inventories and quality-at-source zero-defect components. Equally important, 
Toyota developed an organisational system which allowed for these new 
manufacturing procedures to be achieved throughout its supply chain, 
including first-, second- and third-tier suppliers. This allowed Toyota to 
specialise in its core competences and to outsource non-core components to 
its suppliers. Each of these suppliers was required to meet Toyota-determined 
standards on maximum levels of defects, on frequency and size of deliveries, 
and on other demanding “key performance indicators (KPIs)” which suppliers 
had to achieve. These are loosely summed up as Q-C-D, that is “quality, cost 
and delivery” standards.  
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The Toyota Production System tasked the firm, and its first tier suppliers to 
work actively with their suppliers to upgrade their production operations. This 
had two costs for these lead firms. First, the investments in supply chain 
management and upgrading (a set of standards-intensive procedures) 
required resources, and imposed a pecuniary cost of their operations. 
Second, it required the development of long-term relationships with suppliers. 
Moreover, they also required a stable political and social environment allowing 
for predictability in the management of logistics along the chain (for example, 
good infrastructure and an absence of strikes). 
 
Whilst these long-term high-trust relationships had many positive sides, some 
lead-firms in some global value chains (particularly US-based electronic 
companies) viewed this as a high-cost outcome. They preferred to develop 
more arms-length relationships with competing suppliers, and for this to be 
effective, it would be necessary for suppliers to meet clearly defined 
specifications. Therefore, from the 1990s, and beginning in the electronics 
sector, there was a third round of standards-setting in the private sector, 
allowing for the “modularisation” of production as supplier-firms 
(predominantly located in East Asia) competed to supply components to 
agreed industry-defined technical specifications. 
 
We can thus observe two contrasting paths of value chain standards in 
corporate-driven value chains. One involves close and high-trust relations 
along the chain, with cost-reduction an outcome of largely cooperative efforts 
between lead-buyers and their tiers of suppliers. The second involves the use 
of standards to promote much more conflictive, arms-length relations along 
the chain. 
 
State-sector standards 
Coterminous with the development of these post-war private sector standards 
governing participation in lead-firms’ value chains, there was the development 
of state-imposed standards over health and safety. As per capita incomes 
grew in northern economies, so governments became increasingly aware of 
the need to protect consumers against hazardous materials, components and 
products. In most cases this involved legislation initially aimed at domestic 
producers feeding into domestic markets, but as value chains became 
increasingly global in nature, these health and safety standards were 
extended to intermediate and final products traded over national boundaries. 
 
Civil society  sector standards 
A third family of standards also reflected this confluence of the growth of 
higher incomes in major consuming markets and the globalisation of value 
chains. As northern economies grew in wealth, so civil society organisations 
grew in importance. They began to focus on the ethical and environmental 
character of the products which they were consuming. Under what conditions 
was labour employed in meeting the products which they consumed? What 
was the impact on the environment of the products which they consumed? 
Were these products safe to consume? 
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DIFFERENT TYPES OF STANDARDS 
 
Two major families of standards emerged from this historically evolving 
process of standards-setting – product and process standards. 
 
Product standards 
Product standards address the characteristics of the output from production. 
They are relatively unambiguous, and are defined by the quality requirements 
defined by particular standards-setters. For example, in the case of standards 
set by lead-firms seeking to reduce costs and increase flexibility, this may 
involve the definition of minimum levels of permitted defects. Thus, in the auto 
sector, permissible levels of defects which suppliers must achieve have been 
progressively reduced from 10,000 parts per million to less than 400 parts per 
million. In the food-retailing sector, the product standards which are tested will 
include pesticide residues. In a relatively new development, Walmart is 
increasingly focusing on green-standards, including on the  carbon content of 
products which it sources from its supply chain. In general, these product 
standards are unambiguous and require single-point verification at the end of 
the production process. 
 
Process standards 
Process-standards are more complex and more varied than product 
standards.  
 
1. They are more complex because they typically involve the documentation 
of procedures involved throughout the production process rather than 
measuring a single outcome (as in the case of a product). For example, 
the International Standards Organisation (ISO) quality and environment 
standards (respectively the ISO9000 and ISO14000 series) require the 
documentation of practices and outcomes at various stages of the 
production process. Unlike product standards, they do not set the levels 
which must be achieved, but only require that these levels be checked and 
documented.  
 
2. They are more varied because in some cases they include both the 
documentation of procedures and the achievement of clearly defined and 
measured outcomes. This may involve Key Performance Indicators such 
as the level of the minimum wage, the age of workers and the rights of 
workers to engage in collective bargaining, as well as the introduction of 
processes to minimise hazardous work practices.  
 
3. They are more systemic than product standards because they typically 
involve the documentation and/or achievement of standards throughout 
the chain. For example, the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) 
certification which addresses sustainability in the timber and wood 
products value chain involves a chain of custody which follows the timber 
from its forestry cultivation, through the sawmills, the manufacture of 
processed wood, and in transformation into furniture and other final 
products. A similar process of verification is required throughout the chain 
if producers are to meet the demanding pesticide-residue requirements of 
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global retailers, who demand that a defaulting shipment can be traced 
back all the way to the individual plot of land in which a particular leaf in a 
salad was grown. 
 
The interaction between process and product standards 
Thus, although conceptually distinct, it is not always possible to separate out 
product from process standards. For example, is organic food a product 
standard (whose characteristics can be measured), or a process standard 
(the documentation throughout the chain that inorganic materials are not 
entering the chain)? In most cases, therefore, particular product standard 
outcomes require the application of particular process standards. But the 
obverse is not always the case, that is, given process standards do not 
necessarily produce the targeted product standards. For example, the ISO 
quality and environmental standards only specify that pertinent information is 
systematically collected which will make it easier to achieve given product 
standards. But it is entirely possible – and indeed often the case – that 
producers have achieved the required process certification, but that this is not 
used systematically to improve quality and environmental performance. 
 
 
MAJOR ACTORS IN THE SETTING OF STANDARDS 
 
Four major sets of actors are involved in the setting of standards – private 
sector actors, governments, civil society organisations and international 
industry bodies. 
 
Private sector standard-setters 
In the private sector, individual lead-firms have developed standards to 
determine the efficiency of their value chain operations. Initially these 
corporate standards largely defined the nature of the product. They were 
initially generally unique to the firm. but in some cases, firms began to co-
operate to widen the pool of suppliers on which they could draw (Box 1). The 
concept of “efficiency” also began to widen during the latter decades of the 
20th Century. In addition to focusing on flexibility, inventories, quality and cost 
and focusing on product standards, lead-firms have increasingly also needed 
to respond to civil society pressures on labour standards and the environment 
(Box 2).  
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Box 2: The Electronics industry responds to civil society demands for 
better work practices 
 
“In January 2004, the release of a report by the Catholic Agency for 
Overseas Development “Clean Up Your Computer: Working Conditions in 
the Electronics Sector” shook and shocked the industry… based on 
interviews with workers in Mexico, Thailand and China in factories 
outsourced by IBM, HP and Dell. It revealed unsafe and hazardous 
working environments and many other worrying labour conditions. The 
campaign led many brand name firms, with HP as one of the leaders, and 
contract manufacturers in North America to come together and create the 
Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition in 2004. There are forty members 
in the Coalition today that includes all the major contract manufacturers. 
 
In 2004, the coalition created an industry wide standard, called the 
Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (EICC), based on the HP Supply 
Chain Social and Environmental Responsibility Code of Conduct, to 
replace company-specific codes. Its aim was to ease the ability of 
subcontracted firms and suppliers to comply with a vast amount of diverse 
customer requirements and standards by harmonising them into one 
approach for the industry. The key tool of the EICC is a self assessment 
questionnaire (SAQ), which was based on questionnaires created by brand 
name firms like HP and others. The answers to the SAQ can be posted on 
an on-line database, E-TASC, where all members can access and assess 
for themselves the compliance of suppliers. These tools come at a high 
cost. The subscription fee per supplier site is 500 USD and an additional 
15,000 USD for use of the whole SAQ tool. The EICC also reviews and 
certifies third party auditors.  
 
Source: Reichert, 2010. 
 
Box 1: Evolving supplier standards in the auto industry 
 
The dominant standard in the auto industry’s quality standard is ISO-
TS16949. This is an auto-specific standard administered by the ISO, but 
developed with a sub-committee of OICA (the international vehicle 
assembly association). It has replaced QS-9000 (the American standard), 
and VDA-6 (the German standard, previously widely used in Europe), as 
well as ISO9001/2 (designed generically for all industries). Certain 
assemblers have additional quality achievement levels based on their 
suppliers’ actual quality performance For example, Ford has Q1, 
identifying suppliers who have not had any returns for a period of time and 
who have passed Ford’s annual audit with a clean record. Toyota requires 
ISO accreditations: ISO14001 and ISO-TS16949, but has detailed firm-
specific standards on which it rewards (and punishes) suppliers. 
 
Source: Justin Barnes, Benchmarking Analysts, personal communication 
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Governments as standard-setters 
Governments increasingly set standards governing the traded goods sectors. 
Unlike corporate sector standards where suppliers can perform at differential 
levels (and where suppliers may be rewarded or punished for over- or under-
performance) these legislated standards are mandatory, transparent and 
provide little leeway to producers. Government standards can also vary in 
their sectoral purview. For example the USA mandates Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) certification (which requires processes to 
reduce the risk of contamination in food production) for imports of juice and 
meat, but for other foodstuffs conformance is voluntary. With growing 
international cooperation, particularly in Europe, many legislated standards 
are no longer set by individual governments, but by groups of governments, 
as in the case of standards set by the European Union Commission. For 
example, the EU has adopted a suite of standards governing the “farm-to-
table” chain, targeting a series of linked product and process standards 
governing food safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health. These 
cover both domestic firms selling into the EU and exporters to the EU.  
 
Civil society organisations as standards-setters 
A third set of standard setters are civil society organisations. Unlike either the 
standards which pertain in corporate-governed value chains and those 
standards set by national and international governmental bodies, civil society 
standards are voluntary. However, this does not make these standards less 
important, particularly if producers are seeking to sell into higher-margin niche 
markets. Many of these standards fall under the Fairtrade umbrella, covering 
items such as foodstuffs (for example, coffee where the emphasis is on 
ensuring minimum incomes for producers), intermediate products (such as 
organic cotton and FSC timber, covering environmental issues) and final 
consumer goods (such as apparel, addressing labour standards). Although 
still a small segment of the global market for these items, the pressures 
leading to the adoption of Fairtrade-type certification are forcing many value 
chains to adopt their own, or other analogous standards in their value chains. 
One example of this is Starbucks which has adopted a non-Fairtrade scheme 
to regulate its supply chain (The Rainforest Alliance). Unlike Fairtrade which 
explicitly targets minimum prices paid to farmers and other socio-economic 
standards (Box 3), the Rainforest Scheme focuses on environmental and 
sustainability issues. Similarly, Walmart which, under pressure which it has 
tried to resist on labour standards, has struck-out against criticism by pushing 
through a series of greening standards to its supply chain, involving 2nd and 
3rd tier suppliers (with chain-of-custody type accreditation) as well as 1st tier 
suppliers.  
 
One of the major difficulties with the standards driven by civil society 
organisations is that there are a plethora of confusing and overlapping 
standards which confront producers. This arises as a direct consequence of 
the multiplicity of civil society organisations which are involved. Thus, in the 
apparel industry, many producers in low income economies are involved in a 
costly and often bewildering process of multiple audits of their labour 
standards as each of the lead-buyers bows to pressures from particular civil-
8 
society organisations in their different final markets. Hence in some cases 
large global branding firms have approached neutral bodies like the 
International Labour Organisation to develop a single globally-recognised and 
transparent labour standard which they can apply to their value chains and 
meet the demands of civil society organisations across their final markets. 
 
 
 
 
Industry standard-setters 
International industry bodies represent a fourth category of standard-setters. 
More generally these are industry-specific organisations, often with their roots 
in national industry bodies. For example, the IS09000 quality standards grew 
out the UK British Standards BS5750 certification scheme to address an 
international audience of participating firms. ISO standards generally cover a 
range of sectors, since they target internal processes; hence ISO9000 
certification has been adopted in manufacturing as well as services and 
marketing companies. In other cases, these international standards-setting 
bodies are industry-specific. For example, the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) has grown into the major body regulating practices and 
safety in the shipping industry. Its explicit purpose is both to safeguard 
transport and to prevent “unfair competition” from low-cost and less 
scrupulous shipping lines. In cooperation with governments and civil society 
organisations, this has resulted in a series of standards, such of which have 
Box 3: Fairtrade Certification 
 
“Fairtrade standards are not simply a set of minimum standards for socially 
responsible production and trade. The Fairtrade standards go further in 
seeking to support the development of disadvantaged and marginalized 
small-scale farmers and plantation workers. Fairtrade standards relate to 
three areas of sustainable development: social development, economic 
development and environmental development.  
 
In summary the key objectives of the standards are to:  
• ensure a guaranteed Fairtrade minimum price which is agreed with 
producers 
• provide an additional Fairtrade premium which can be invested in 
projects that enhance social, economic and environmental 
development  
• enable pre-financing for producers who require it 
• emphasize the idea of partnership between trade partners 
• facilitate mutually beneficial long-term trading relationships  
• set clear minimum and progressive criteria to ensure that the 
conditions for the production and trade of a product are socially and 
economically fair and environmentally responsible.” 
http://www.Fairtrade.org.uk/what_is_Fairtrade/Fairtrade_certification_and_the_Fairtra
de_mark/Fairtrade_standards.aspx, accessed 24th June 2010. 
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been enacted into law by most governments, and others which are considered 
to be beneficial and which are advisory (Box 4). 
 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF STANDARDS IN ENTERPRISE UPGRADING 
 
Different dimensions of upgrading 
Classically upgrading at the enterprise level has been seen in terms of the 
improvement in production processes (arising from a combination of new 
procedures and applying new technologies) and in products (new products, 
improved products, more differentiated products and higher quality products).  
 
However, the increasing expansion of global value chains has added two new 
dimensions to our understanding of upgrading. These arise because of the 
competitive pressures in the global economy which have led to the 
widespread global diffusion of capabilities in manufacturing. This has resulted 
in lead-firms governing global value chains to introduce standards to ensure 
enhanced product quality and flexibility as lead firms outsource those parts of 
the production cycle which are easy to undertake. The first of these two 
additional categories of upgrading is functional upgrading, in which firms 
change their position in the chain, moving from areas of high competition (as 
in manufacturing) into areas of low competition (for example, branding, 
logistics and marketing (Figure 1). The second additional form of upgrading is 
Box 4: Standards setting in the International Maritime Agency 
 
Nine International Maritime Organisation sub-committees set standards 
governing different areas of shipping. These cover: 
 
• Safety of Navigation (NAV), 
• Radio Communication and Search and Rescue (COMSAR), 
• Training and Watch-keeping (STW), 
• Carriage of Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSCC), 
• Ship Design and Equipment (DE), 
• Fire Protection (FP), 
• Stability and Load Lines and Fishing Vessel Safety (SLF), 
• Flag State Implementation (FSI), and 
• Bulk Liquids and Gases (BLG). 
 
Thirty-six Inter-Governmental Organizations including the EC (Commission 
of the European Communities), Helsinki Commission (The Baltic Marine 
Environment Protection Commission), Commonwealth Secretariat and 
INMARSAT have concluded agreements of co-operation with the IMO. 
Sixty-three Non-Governmental Organizations hold consultative status with 
the IMO.  
 
Source: http://www.balticmaster.org/media/files/general_files_693.pdf (accessed June 
24th 2010). 
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moving to new chains, as in the case of Illy Coffee whose past competences 
were in tin manufacture, but which now specialises in high-quality coffee, 
coffee-making machines and coffee bars. 
 
Figure 1: Functional upgrading in Global Value Chains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What role to standards play in this more complex picture of upgrading? In 
many cases, firms adopting the various sets of standards required to 
participate in global value chains have experienced considerable 
improvements in both process and product upgrading. Meeting the needs of 
demanding corporate chain leaders to enhance Q-C-D ((Quality, Cost, 
Delivery) has invariably meant that firms have had to change their practices 
on inventories (reducing working capital costs), to restructure their plant 
layouts, to move from quality-at-the-end of the line to quality-at-source and to 
introduce new equipment which boosts productivity and enhances product 
quality. Similarly, firms participating in global value chains which require 
conformance to civil-society driven standards on health, safety, work-practices 
and the environment are generally able to participate in high-margin niche 
markets. Perhaps most importantly, without responding to these demands for 
higher process and product standards, firms risk being excluded altogether 
from global value chains.  
 
There is an important caveat here, however, since as we saw in the case of 
ISO Standards, the adoption of process standards may provide the capability 
to enhance productivity and reduce costs, but this capability may or may not 
be utilised to achieve these ends. Firms may be able to monitor quality 
performance at each stage of the production cycle through the use of 
ISO9000 procedures, but unless these performance indicators are actually 
used to “stretch” efficiency – through setting and meeting a series of targets 
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for systematic improvement – the achievement of standards accreditation will 
have little impact on the firms capacity to upgrade. 
 
There is little indication that the adoption of either process or product 
standards has had a significant impact on the capacity of firms to either 
engage in functional or inter-chain upgrading. These require entirely different 
strategic and technical capabilities. Moreover, it is this capability to upgrade 
functionally and into new chains which provides the capacity for sustained 
income growth over time in many value chains. Hence, whilst standards 
clearly have an important role to play in stretching process capabilities and 
some product capabilities in firms inserted in global value chains, too much 
expectation should not be placed on their capacity to assist the core strategic 
upgrading which affects long-term survival and sustainable incomes. The 
upgrading challenge is a much wider challenge than responding to demands 
for the introduction of new standards. 
 
 
THE COSTS OF IMPLEMENTING STANDARDS 
 
Even though there may be a payback to the firm in effectively implementing 
standards arising from higher product prices, lower costs and larger volumes 
(due to selling to large-scale buyers), the achievement of standards will never 
be costless. The financial costs of accreditation itself may be low, but there 
will always be resource costs in acquiring, and then maintaining accreditation 
– managerial time, training, new procedures and new equipment.  Moreover, 
there may also be significant “lock-in costs” when suppliers invest heavily in 
meeting the specific standards of a particular firm (as in traceability in 
horticulture, where different retail firms have different types of paper-trails), 
and may find it costly to make the switch to a different lead-buyer’s standards 
procedures. 
 
These costs will necessarily vary across industries. Achieving the standards 
required to sell into the defence sector will obviously be orders of magnitude 
more costly than those involved in the certification of organic coffee. 
Examples in the variation of costs show the degree of inter-industry variance: 
 
• In the Gabonese timber industry, one large forest holding reported the 
cost of acquiring initial FSC certification (which requires action through 
the chain of production) at €4m, with an annual cost of maintaining 
accreditation of around €100,000. A second Gabonese firm estimated 
its environmental compliance cost at €2.10 per hectare, in the context 
of an estimated minimum economic forest-holding of 50,000 hectares. 
A third large forest-holding company estimated the cost of achieving 
the CFAD (Sustainable Forest Management accreditation) to be in 
excess of €1.5m. (Information provided by A. Terheggen, personal 
communication) 
 
• By comparison the costs of compliance to health and safety and the 
ISO14001 environmental standard in the Malaysian electronics industry 
was considerably lower. A large MNC estimated the annual costs of 
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maintaining its ISO14001 certification and the international 
occupational health and safety management system standard  
(OHSAS 18001) certification to be around $4,600. A second MNC 
reported the cost of OHSAS certification to be $278 p.a. Two second-
tier suppliers estimated the costs of maintaining ISO14001 
accreditation at between $4,600 and $9,275 p.a. Most of these cost 
estimates however are based on previous investments by the firms in 
setting in place the processes and procedures for certification and 
these relatively low cost-estimates only relate to the annual costs of 
maintaining registration. (Information provided by G.Reichert, personal 
communication) 
 
The key issue in considering the costs of standards-accreditation is thus best 
seen in relation to the size and financial viability of the suppliers involved. 
Whilst these levels of expenditure may be affordable to MNCs or large locally-
owned suppliers, they often act to exclude smaller scale suppliers. One 
reason for this exclusion is the financial cost. Hence in the Thai cassava value 
chain, a number of smaller plants have had to withdraw from exporting to the 
EU as the costs of achieving GMP and HACCP accreditation are too high. 
These firms reported that it was not just the cost of accreditation itself, but that 
HACCP implementation requires trained staff and the maintenance of records 
(Information provided by J. Tijaja, personal communication). A second reason 
why small scale – and especially informal sector – firms may be excluded 
from participating in global value chains is that they lack the capacity and 
culture to systematically record and store the information required to achieve 
and maintain standards accreditation. 
 
Hence, because of a combination of acquisition costs, the costs of 
maintaining accreditation and the lack of the capabilities to implement and 
sustain accreditation, the advance of standards in global value chains 
unambiguously acts to exclude small scale and informal sector producers 
from many global markets 
 
 
DIFFERENCES IN FINAL MARKETS 
 
The history of the evolution of standards in global value chains shows that in 
various ways these have been driven by the characteristics of final markets. 
High-income consumers require high-quality and frequently differentiated 
products, for which they are prepared to pay a premium. This has led lead-
firms in global value chains to introduce standards in heir chains to ensure 
that they can meet these demands timeously and at low cost. High per-capita 
incomes and the associated revenue streams accruing to governments have 
led many northern states to progressively ratchet-up the product standards 
which they require suppliers to meet in order to ensure the healthy and safety 
of their citizens. And the growth of civil-society organisations in the context of 
high per capita incomes has resulted in the call for high ethical and 
environmental standards in the products imported into their economies. 
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But what happens to the importance of standards when trade products are 
sold into low-income markets, where consumers lack the incomes to pay for 
differentiated and high quality products, where governments cannot afford to 
monitor and implement consumer safety standards and where civil society 
organisations are either underdeveloped or their attention is not given to 
environmental issues or labour standards? 
 
Emerging evidence – and it sin only emerging evidence, since this is a 
relatively new phenomenon - suggests that in these circumstances, standards 
play a much less important role in global value chains. Two examples 
illustrate this – in both cases the contrast is drawn between the growth of 
exports to China at the cost of exports previously destined to the EU market: 
 
• Thailand’s exporters of cassava pellets to the EU are required to meet 
two demanding sets of standards - GMP (Good Manufacturing 
Practice) covering sanitary and processing procedures, and HACCP 
(Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point) as cassava pellets are an input 
into animal feeds. By contrast, their exports of dried cassava to China 
are not subject to either GMP or HACCP certification, but only require a 
minimum level of starch-content. 
 
• Gabonese timber exporters selling into the EU and China face very 
different markets in terms of standards. Entry into Europe is covered by 
much more intense standards, both private standards specified by 
global buyers, and mandatory standards set by governments and 
international bodies (Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2: Corporate and state/Inter-state standards affecting timber 
exports from Gabon to the EU and China 
 
 
 
Source: Information supplied by A. Terheggen. 
 
In both Thailand’s cassava industry and Gabon’s timber industry there has 
been a decisive shift in the final market over the past 15 years from the EU to 
China. Whilst producers who continue to sell into Europe remain subject to 
intensive standards in their global value chains, this is not the case when they 
export the same products to China. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Given the growing centrality of standards to in global value chains, 
governments and international agencies providing support for producers 
seeking to enter the global economy in a manner which provides for 
sustainable income growth, need necessarily to engage with the challenge of 
promoting standards. This is however a complex challenge, and a suitably 
multi-pronged and nuanced response is required. Seven policy issues are 
raised: 
 
1. Promoting awareness of standards 
The review of the history of standards in global production and trade shows 
that standards have a long history. However, it also showed that recent 
decades have seen a rapid increase in the pace, in the variety and in the 
complexity of standards. It is incumbent on each government or supporting 
agency to ensure that the producers in their lead and emerging sectors are 
aware of the nature and changing portfolio of standards, and of the 
consequences of achieving or not achieving them as well as the steps which 
are required to achieve standards where this is a feasible and sensible 
objective. Awareness and knowledge are thus the cornerstones of a policy on 
standards and gainful participation in global value chains. Are governments 
aware whether their economies possess the certification bodies and 
capabilities required to gainfully meet global standards requirements? To what 
extent do their standards align with global standards, and does this matter? 
 
2. Ensure that standards do not rule out local suppliers 
In some sectors, lead firms specify standards which have the unintended 
consequence of ruling out local suppliers. This is, for example, a common 
case in Africa’s mining sector, where the mine-commissioning firms often 
specify the use of standards for items such as electrical fittings and piping 
which are used in their home market, but not in the local market. (In Tanzania 
this has led to the exclusion of existing suppliers utilising UK rather than 
Australian specifications). Particularly in large infrastructural and mining 
contracts (where in both there is considerable potential for local linkages), 
governments need to be aware of the need for lead-contractors to utilise 
those standards which are in currency in the domestic economy. 
 
3. Role of lead firms in promoting standards 
In many sectors, a key driver of standards are the lead-firms in global value 
chains. There are, however, two contrasting outcomes of the standards 
imposed in corporate-driven value chains. The first is reflected in the 
contributions made to metal- and plastics-working suppliers by global auto-
assemblers. Driven by the imperatives of lean production, auto assemblers 
have made it their business to upgrade their suppliers’ performance through 
the systematic use of standards, setting a moving target of standards which 
suppliers need to meet.  Attracting these firms as a way of upgrading their 
supply chains (which also feed into other value chains and hence have spread 
effects) has been a core and successful component of government industrial 
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policy in high income and middle income countries alike (for example, the UK 
and South Africa). 
 
Less relevant to widespread capability-building have been corporate 
standard-setters who have been concerned to identify industry standards 
precisely to minimise their responsibilities to upgrade their supply chain and to 
promote competition between suppliers. This is referred to as the use of 
standards to promote the modularisation of component supply.  
 
4. Government must assist firms where lead firms do not 
Where lead-firms do not engage in upgrading their supply chains, a key 
challenge for policy-makers is to ensure that a system of incentives is 
introduced to enhance both the demand for appropriate standards by firms 
wishing to participate gainfully in global value chains, and the capacity of local 
providers to supply support for local firms seeking to achieve accreditation. 
Support for the business services sector is a key component of this agenda. 
In some cases this may be provided by the relevant industry association  In 
other cases, specialised providers may address the needs of many industries, 
such as those offering to assist firms to introduce ISO9000 and ISO14000 
standards. 
 
5. Assisting small scale producers 
Special problems arise for small firms, since achieving standards-
accreditation may be a relatively costly process (the costs tend to be fixed, 
irrespective of scale, and thus adversely affect small producers). One way of 
reducing these scale economies is by a group of small producers banding 
together to share the costs of certification, both in its initial and then annual 
re-certification stages. But this will only diminish the disadvantage confronting 
small producers, not remove it. A strategic decision will then have to be made 
on whether there is no place for small producers in standards-intensive global 
value chains, or whether some form of subsidised scheme should be 
established to sustain their participation. This will require a country- and 
sector-specific set of judgements, balancing off distributional concerns and 
the upgrading benefits of standards against their fiscal and economic cost. 
 
6. Targeting low income markets 
There is growing evidence that the standards-agenda is to a large extent a 
function of market-characteristics, and in general low-income markets are less 
standards-intensive than are high-income markets. It follows from this that 
individual producers, or countries, may actively segment these markets. Some 
firms – perhaps small scale producers – and some production lines may be 
dedicated to the low-income markets, whilst others develop the standards’ 
capabilities to participate in high-income markets. This is an agenda for firms 
and their industry-associations, and for governments engaged in industrial 
policy designed to maximise the gains from participating in the global 
economy. 
 
7. Harmonising standards and developing countries participation in 
standards-setting bodies 
16 
Many developing country firms are confronted with a bewildering variety of 
standards which their producers have to meet, and at considerable cost. This 
is perhaps most evident with regard to labour standards, but it is not unique to 
labour standards. At the same time, some of the technical industry standards 
which are set reflect the operating conditions in high-income economies – 
predominantly temperate climates with pervasive and reliable infrastructure. In 
these and other cases, low income country governments need to participate 
actively in standards-settings in those international fora which are relevant to 
producers in their local economy. Particularly for small economies, this may 
also best be undertaken through collaborative specialisation and through 
collective action. 
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Figure 3 in black and white if you need it for printing. 
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